Burnham, Streeting, Starmer … What’s the point?

The prospect of Andy Burnham returning to Westminster through a parliamentary by-election would immediately transform the political conversation. For years, Burnham has occupied an unusual position in British politics: a Labour politician who has managed to maintain a national profile while remaining outside the day-to-day battles of Westminster. As Mayor of Greater Manchester, he has cultivated a reputation for speaking his mind, challenging governments of different colours, and presenting himself as a politician more interested in practical solutions than party manoeuvring.

It is therefore unsurprising that whenever Labour encounters difficulties, Burnham’s name resurfaces as a potential future leader. For some on the centre-left, he represents a more authentic voice than the current leadership. For others, he is seen as a politician capable of reconnecting Labour with voters who have drifted away over the past decade. A successful by-election victory would inevitably reignite speculation about his ambitions and his future role within the party.

Yet winning a by-election would be the easy part. The harder challenge would begin the moment he arrived back in Westminster.

British politics has a habit of treating leadership changes as silver bullets. Whenever a government struggles, attention quickly turns to personalities. Political commentators ask whether a different leader would perform better. Party members debate whether another figure could communicate more effectively. Voters, frustrated by stagnation, often look for someone new to break the deadlock.

But politics is rarely that simple.

If Burnham were to return to Parliament and eventually launch a leadership bid, he would inherit exactly the same structural problems confronting any potential Labour leader. Those problems do not disappear simply because a different person occupies the office.

The United Kingdom faces a daunting combination of challenges. Economic growth remains sluggish by historical standards. Public services are under immense pressure after years of rising demand and constrained resources. The NHS continues to struggle with waiting lists and workforce shortages. Housing remains unaffordable for millions of younger people. Productivity growth has been weak for well over a decade. Local government finances are stretched. Infrastructure projects move slowly and often cost far more than anticipated. These are not problems that can be solved through force of personality alone.

Indeed, one of the defining features of modern British politics has been the growing gap between political expectations and governmental capacity. Leaders campaign on ambitious promises but discover once in office that the state has limited room for manoeuvre. Fiscal constraints, demographic pressures, global economic trends, and institutional weaknesses all narrow the range of available options.

Andy Burnham may offer Labour a different style of leadership. But the constraints that have frustrated successive governments would follow him to Downing Street. One of the defining features of modern British politics is the widening gap between what voters expect from their governments and what governments are capable of delivering.

Political leaders campaign on promises of renewal. They pledge to improve public services, revive economic growth, build more homes and restore confidence in the political system. Yet once in office, they discover that the scope for meaningful change is narrower than their rhetoric suggested. Fiscal constraints, demographic pressures, weak productivity growth and institutional shortcomings all limit the government’s room for manoeuvre. Global economic developments and international crises introduce further complications, often at precisely the moment when ministers are attempting to implement domestic reforms.

This has become a recurring problem for governments of different political persuasions. Conservative prime ministers encountered it. Labour governments have encountered it. Any future occupant of No. 10 is likely to encounter it, too. Sir Keir Starmer’s critics argue that he has been too cautious, too managerial or insufficiently willing to make decisive choices. His defenders contend that he inherited an exceptionally difficult set of circumstances and has had to reconcile competing demands with limited resources. Both arguments have merit. But they risk overlooking a more fundamental question about the nature of political leadership in Britain today.

The office of prime minister has become an exercise in managing expectations that no government can realistically satisfy. Public demands remain extensive, while the political environment has grown more fragmented and unforgiving. Social media ensures that mistakes are amplified almost instantaneously. The news cycle moves relentlessly, public trust remains fragile and economic constraints limit the choices available to ministers.

At the same time, the prime minister is expected to respond to international crises, oversee public services, stimulate growth, address the housing shortage, strengthen national defence, tackle climate change and improve living standards. The list is virtually endless. The resources available to meet those demands are not.The result is a political system in which the promise of leadership often proves more attractive than the reality of governing.

Leadership contests are exercises in possibility. Candidates offer competing visions, supporters invest their hopes in particular personalities, and political parties briefly entertain the prospect that a change at the top might resolve problems that have resisted successive administrations. Government quickly introduces a less accommodating set of circumstances.

Promises must be translated into budgets. Priorities compete for funding. Policies encounter administrative obstacles. Decisions that appear straightforward in opposition become complicated when their costs, consequences and unintended effects become apparent. Disappointment follows, often regardless of whether the government has made genuine progress.This helps explain why political leadership contests can generate such excitement while the governments that emerge from them struggle to sustain public enthusiasm. A new leader offers the prospect of a fresh beginning. Governing requires confronting the accumulated consequences of the past.

Andy Burnham would be no exception.

Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, has established himself as one of Labour’s most prominent figures outside Parliament. His supporters see him as a politician who communicates with greater instinct, articulates a clearer political vision and connects more readily with voters who feel detached from Westminster.

There are grounds for taking those arguments seriously. His mayoralty has given him a platform from which to champion Greater Manchester’s interests, challenge central government and present himself as an advocate for regional devolution. He has demonstrated a willingness to enter political disputes and make the case for a different relationship between Westminster and the rest of England. Those qualities could prove valuable in national politics. A leader who communicates clearly, identifies priorities and persuades voters that government understands their concerns has an advantage over one who struggles to explain what it is trying to achieve.

Burnham might also offer Labour a different political temperament. He could prove more comfortable articulating a broad vision for the country, more instinctive in his public communication or more effective at reaching voters who have grown disillusioned with the established political class.

But these are possibilities, not guarantees. And even if every one of them proved correct, the underlying difficulties confronting Britain would remain. A more persuasive prime minister cannot immediately build hundreds of thousands of homes. A more charismatic leader cannot reverse decades of weak productivity growth in a parliamentary term. Greater popularity cannot, by itself, generate the tax revenues required to finance every public service commitment. Political skill matters. The ability to set priorities, build coalitions and explain difficult decisions can make a substantial difference to the success of a government. But leadership has limits, particularly when the problems in question are structural rather than personal.

There is a persistent tendency in British politics to treat national difficulties as though they are primarily the consequence of whoever happens to occupy Downing Street. Change the prime minister, the argument goes, and the country might finally move in a different direction.

There is some truth in this. Leaders make decisions that affect investment, public spending, regulation and the operation of the state. Different governments can pursue meaningfully different policies, and the quality of political judgment can influence economic and social outcomes.

Yet Britain’s difficulties have accumulated over decades, under governments of different parties. Weak productivity growth, pressure on public services, housing shortages and regional economic disparities cannot be attributed to a single administration. Nor can they be resolved simply by replacing one politician with another. They are embedded in economic structures, demographic developments and institutional arrangements that take years to change.

Building homes requires more than announcing targets. It involves planning decisions, infrastructure, construction capacity and the availability of land and finance. Improving public services requires not only funding but also effective management, a sufficient workforce and reforms that produce measurable improvements. Raising productivity depends on investment, skills, technology and the conditions in which businesses operate.

These are not problems that disappear when a new prime minister enters Downing Street. They require sustained effort over many years, potentially across multiple parliamentary terms. Progress may be gradual, uneven and difficult to translate into immediate political rewards. That is the uncomfortable reality that would confront Burnham just as surely as it confronts Starmer.

If Burnham were to pursue the Labour leadership, he would face a familiar political dilemma. To win, he would need to persuade party members and colleagues that he represents a meaningful alternative to the current leadership. He would have to explain what he would do differently, why his approach would be more effective and how he would restore confidence in Labour’s ability to deliver.

Yet the more ambitious his promises, the greater the risk of repeating the cycle that has frustrated previous governments: elevated expectations followed by the discovery that the available options are more limited than advertised.

A credible leadership campaign would therefore need to strike a difficult balance. It would have to offer a convincing sense of direction without pretending that Britain’s problems could be resolved quickly. It would need to explain not only what a new government wanted to achieve, but also what it would prioritise, what it would postpone and what it could not reasonably promise.

That might mean acknowledging that some improvements would take years to become visible. It might mean explaining why certain popular policies could not be afforded, or why difficult reforms would produce benefits only gradually. Such a campaign would be less intoxicating than one built around the promise of national renewal. But it might offer a more durable foundation for government.

Whether voters and Labour members would respond to that kind of realism is another matter. Politics rewards optimism, clarity and confidence. It is less forgiving of qualifications, constraints and explanations of why things cannot happen immediately. Yet a leader who wins by encouraging unrealistic expectations may find that the victory contains the seeds of subsequent disappointment. For now, Burnham remains an important figure in the debate about Labour’s future, but the distinction between political speculation and an actual route to the leadership matters.

A return to Westminster would be a significant step. Winning a parliamentary seat, should an appropriate opportunity arise, would not automatically translate into a successful leadership campaign. Nor would winning the leadership necessarily resolve Labour’s electoral difficulties or establish that Burnham’s approach would prove more effective in government. Each stage would present its own obstacles.

First would come the practical and political challenge of returning to Parliament. Then the task of securing sufficient support within the Labour Party. Beyond that would lie the far more demanding responsibility of governing a country facing deep-rooted economic and institutional problems.

And even a successful prime minister would eventually have to confront the question that has dogged so many of their predecessors: how to demonstrate meaningful progress when the public expects rapid improvements and the machinery of government moves slowly.

British politics remains unpredictable. Economic conditions can change, public opinion can shift and political fortunes can reverse with remarkable speed. A politician who appears well placed for national leadership one year may find the opportunity has disappeared the next. It would therefore be premature to treat Burnham’s future as settled. But the questions raised by the prospect of his return to Westminster extend beyond his personal ambitions or Starmer’s political standing. They concern the limits of political leadership itself.

Changing a prime minister can alter the tone of government. It can change priorities, improve communication and lead to better decisions. In some circumstances, a change of leadership can make a substantial difference to a country’s direction. But it cannot eliminate the trade-offs inherent in governing a country with finite resources and extensive public needs.

The next prime minister will inherit many of the same constraints as the current one, regardless of party or personality. The challenge will be to distinguish between problems that can be solved through better leadership and those that require deeper, longer-term changes to Britain’s economy and institutions. That distinction is crucial. If every failure is attributed to the person at the top, politics risks becoming an endless search for a sufficiently talented individual to overcome problems that no individual can resolve alone. The cycle is familiar: a leader arrives promising renewal, encounters the limits of government and disappoints a public that expected more. Another leader emerges, offers a different style and raises hopes once again. The names change. The underlying difficulties endure.

For Burnham, the question is not simply whether he could communicate more effectively than Starmer or offer Labour a more compelling political identity. It is whether his approach could translate into tangible improvements in living standards, public services and economic opportunity โ€” and whether those improvements could be sustained despite the constraints that have frustrated successive governments.

That is a much harder test than winning a by-election, a leadership contest or even a general election.The real challenge facing Britain’s next prime minister is not merely to persuade the country that things can change. It is to demonstrate that government still has the capacity to make that change happen.

To what extent was the Zionist movement successful in achieving its objectives in 1948?

**For those of you who do not know. I did a Masterโ€™s Degree in โ€˜International History and Politicsโ€™ at The University of Leeds and graduated in 2020. I got a Distinction. I was good. **

I haven’t posted on this blog in over a year (a surprise to myself)! I remember stopping because ChatGPT started to become regularly used and people were suspecting that I was using it to write my articles. I never have for my blog posts; I’ve never seen the point and I’ve never even thought ChatGPT is even that good. It is NOT AI. It is, what I like to call, ‘advanced Googling’.

But with the genocide currently going on in Gaza, conducted by Israel (let’s just call it what it is), I remembered this morning that I actually did a very long module on ‘The Israel-Palestine Conflict’ and completed it in 2019. This essay got 81/100 – so it’s bloody good. Of course, I was writing it 6 years ago so my views where tempered quite a lot compared to how they are now. But I thought I would share this, just as a brief history lesson of such a messy conflict.

I have a lot I could write here about Netanyahu being one of the worst dictators of the modern age. I could write about how Israel’s nuclear regime is suspect, with not even top cabinet members having knowledge of how many nukes they possess.

I just want to quickly recount Mehdi Hasan’s (a genius) debate with Danny Ayalon (former Israeli Cabinet Minister), in which Ayalon himself says that he has no idea how many nukes Israel has. Hasan points out the hypocrisy of this by stating: “Imagine if an Iranian Ambassador came onto this show and I asked how many nukes they had and he just shrugged and said, ‘I dunno’, would you not be outraged? Can you not see the blatant hypocrisy?”

Ayalon admits yes! Hassan then beautifully reminds Ayalon that Iran, and its’ surrounding Arab nations had subscribed to UN Resolution 487. Ayalon insists there is no such resolution concerning Israel’s nuclear capabilities; to which Hassan responds, quoting the resolution, stating that “This board furthermore notes that Israel has not adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Making the area deeply concerned about the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June 1981.”

I do not ignore the events of October 7th, horrific and monstrous as they were, but I ask – what about the events on October the 6th? What about the events on October the 8th, or 9th … or 10th? Or YESTERDAY? The essay beneath is an extremely tempered version of my views now, not only because the situation was vastly different 6 years ago, but also because (and I won’t lie about this) I wanted to secure a good grade in this module.

But for those of you who do not want to read the entire essay, here’s a summary: No, the Zionist movement WAS NOT WHOLLY successful in achieving its objectives in 1948. Zionists wanted to escape Europe and find a peaceful homeland. They wanted to escape the horrors placed upon Jewish people by the Holocaust and the Soviet Union.

Leaders of the Zionist movement even considered Argentina as a ‘homeland’ to be safe, they just wanted a recognised state that was AWAY from Europe! If leading Zionist thinkers, such as Theodore Herzl, could see what Israel is conducting today they would be appalled, ashamed and embarrassed by the horrific scenes they had created. There is a difference between being anti-Israel and antisemitic. Israel is a rogue, fascist, murdering state. Jewish people are Jewish people, from different places all over the world, most of whom, to their credit, have renounced the actions of Israel.

And that is why I have finally decided to post this essay, as I am reminded of Martin Niemรถller’s brilliant poem (rather ironically, written by an initial supporter of Hitler, until he began to see how the Nazis were treating minorities withing Germany): “First they came for…”:

First they came for the Communists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Communist
Then they came for the Socialists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Socialist
Then they came for the Trade Unionists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Trade Unionist
Then they came for the Jews
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Jew
Then they came for ME
And there was no one left
To speak out for me
.

And SO … (FINALLY) … MY ESSAY FROM 2019:

Candidate Name: Nesaar Uppal  
Candidate Number: ############
Module Name: The Israel-Palestine Conflict
Module Code: PIED5501M

The early modern roots of the Zionist movement emerged from the persistent persecution of Jewish people across Europe for hundreds of years (Halperin, 2015). This persecution caused Jewish people to be spread all across Europe and the Middle East in diaspora.[1] Seeing this persecution, diaspora and finding a religious right to create a Jewish homeland many believed that people of the Jewish faith deserved their own land and their own government (Herzl, 1895; Weizmann, 2005). Theodore Herzl, one of the first Zionist thinkers and perhaps the most influential, planned to create a homeland for Jews to escape persecution in Europe. The creation of an internationally recognised Jewish homeland was indeed the main aim of the Zionist movement, with Eichler (2016) noting that โ€˜the official goal of the Zionist movement โ€ฆ a Jewish national home to be secured by international law.โ€™ However, a number of other Zionist objectives emerged causing divisions within the Zionist movement about which aims to pursue first. Along with creating a Jewish homeland and ending diaspora, Herzl genuinely wanted to also bring economic prosperity to the region, with better infrastructure and more finance Herzl hoped that Jewish immigration would โ€˜help them (Arabs) raise their own economic standardโ€™ (Weinstock, 2011, p.50).

Herzlโ€™s desire for a mass migration of Jews to the Middle East to end diaspora, referred to as Aliyah, took place in waves, with the first being between 1881 and 1903 (Greilsammer, 2011). However, as the third and fourth Aliyahโ€™s took place in the 1920s and 1930s more and more communist Jews from Eastern Europe brought their communist ideas to the Jewish homeland, hoping to create a communist state (Greilsammer, 2011). After the devastating persecution which occurred during the Second World War the immigration of Jews to Palestine increased massively; Weinstock (1973, p.55) commented that โ€˜fascism in Europe gave considerable impulse โ€ฆ at the end of the Second World War the 583,000 Jews represented 1/3 of the Palestine population.โ€™ This continued immigration, purchasing of Arab land and refusal to allow Arabs to work on Jewish-owned land led to increased tensions.[2] These tensions came to a helm in 1947 and 1948. In 1947 the United Nations issued resolution 181 which called for a partition plan of Palestine, effectively granting a Jewish homeland in the region and greatly angering the Arab League (Greilsammer, 2011, p.44). Following this, in 1948 a coalition of Arab forces invaded Israel in 1948, the day after the Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion declared independence for Israel. During the following ten months of fighting the Arab coalition eventually lost and was forced to retreat, with Israel taking control of the whole of Palestine and a large section of Transjordan, 60% more land than what they had been guaranteed by the UN (Rogan, 2008, pp.102-103).

In a number of ways, it could be contended that the Zionist movement was very successful in achieving its objectives in 1948. It became an internationally recognised sovereign state which was indeed the key aim of Zionism; it was also able to provide a safe homeland for persecuted Jews and whilst diaspora was never fully achieved and later referred to as โ€˜idealisticโ€™ it still provided refugee for hundreds of thousands of Jews. However, in a number of other ways it failed in achieving its original objectives. Herzl envisaged a model society based on equality with Arabs, as Karsh (2006, p.470) demonstrates that โ€˜the archives show that rather than seek the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs, the Zionist leaders believed that there was sufficient room in Palestine for both peoples to live side by side in peace and equality.โ€™ This failure to assimilate with Palestinian Arabs was further compounded by Jewish settlerโ€™s hoarding land and wealth from Arabs, creating a Jewish elite and not an equal society. There are a number of reasons for the success of the Zionist movement in 1948. Support from the West, particularly the USA and the UN, was vital in securing their independence. Moreover, Britainโ€™s withdrawal from the region and their simultaneous problems with India and Pakistan gaining independence meant that support for the Arab cause dwindled after the Second World War. Furthermore, Israelโ€™s superior financial situation, technology and international support meant they were able to win the 1948 war and secure a sovereign state for themselves.

The primary Zionist objective was to create an internationally-recognised national home for Jewish people; Weinstock (1973, p.51) notes that when Herzl โ€˜convened the first Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897โ€™ he described the Zionist aim โ€˜as being the establishment for Jewish people of a home in Palestine secured by public law.โ€™ Certainly, this was achieved first with the UN resolution 181 in 1947 which guaranteed a partition plan but was then further emphasised by David Ben-Gurionโ€™s declaration of independence in May 1948. Moreover, Zionists also wanted to see โ€˜the revival of the Hebrew language and cultureโ€™ and saw this โ€˜as one of the essential elements of a new societyโ€™ (Greilsammer, 2011, p.43). Indeed, there can be little debate about the success of Zionism with regards to this particular aspect of their objectives. Conforti (2011, p.572-573) reaffirms this success by analysing the UNโ€™s actions after the British withdrawal from the region, concluding that โ€˜from the legal point of view, the resolution of November 1947 that decided the division of Palestine in a Jewish and an Arab state was the international communityโ€™s (UN and USA) endorsement of the creation of Israelโ€™. However, the creation of a Jewish national home was not supposed to come at the expense of the Palestinian population. Numerous times, Herzl and other key Zionist leaders expressed their desire to share the land with Arab Palestinians. After analysing Herzlโ€™s works, Karsh (2006, p.471) concludes that โ€˜there was no trace of such a belief (that Arabs should be expelled to allow Jews to enter Palestine) in either Herzlโ€™s famous political treatise The Jewish State (1896) or his 1902 Zionist novel Altneuland (Old-New Land).โ€™ Numerous political leaders shared this idea of peaceful co-habitation with the Arab population. Indeed, as early as 1934, โ€˜Jabotinskyโ€™s Revisionist Party prepared a draft constitution for Jewish Palestine, which put the Arab minority on an equal footing with its Jewish counterpart โ€˜throughout all sectors of the countryโ€™s public lifeโ€™ (Karsh, 2006, p.473). Thus, the apparent success in 1948 of creating an internationally recognised Jewish state is undoubtedly tainted by the fact that this came at the expense of a lot of Jewish and Arab lives and created a high level of animosity between the Jewish population in Israel and the surrounding Arab nations. The creation of the state was, as Greilsammer (1973, p.50) โ€˜on some levels, an incredible successโ€™.

The success of the Zionists in creating a nation-state was due to a number of contributing factors and fortunate circumstances, including Western support, British withdrawal and Arab divisions. Eichler is perhaps the historian who places the most emphasis on Western aid benefitting Zionism, asking โ€˜how could we even think of the Zionist movement succeeding without support from Western colonial powers?โ€™ (Eichler, 2016, p.8). After the end of the Second World War the British Empire was in full retreat and the British government could not afford to sustain its influence across the globe, it had also become heavily indebted to the USA who were very anti-imperialist. These factors forced Britain to retreat further from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the Middle East in general. Moreover, Conforti (2011, p.570-571) astutely comments that โ€˜it (Israel) emerged at the same time as independent India and Pakistan, a time when the British Empire was crumbling, and the Zionist movement was able to take advantage of British weakness.โ€™ Zionist leaders, sensing this withdrawal, used an โ€˜armed insurrectionโ€™ to โ€˜force the British to turn over the Palestine file to the UNโ€™ (Eichler, 2016, p.8).  Also, the Zionists were able to achieve their objective of creating and securing a Jewish homeland because of divisions within the Arab League.[3] These divisions were exploited by the Israeli armed forces. Indeed, Rai (2014, p.2) notes that Zionists were successful in 1948 because โ€˜the Arab governments all pursued their own objectives, with King Abdullah of Transjordan willing to accept a Jewish state in return for territorial gains.โ€™ These divisions were further compounded by the fact that the newly formed Israel was more unified, better equipped and more financially able to sustain a war (Weinstock, 1973) Indeed, Weinstock (1973, p.58) estimates that, in the 1940s, โ€˜the Arab industrial sector amounted at most to 10% of the global Palestinian industrial produceโ€™ and that โ€˜in 1942 โ€ฆ Arab industry in Palestine consisted of 1,558 establishments engaging 8,804 persons.โ€™ Weinstock (1973, p.58) therefore concludes that the Zionists were able to create and protect their sovereign state because they were โ€˜possessing technological and financial advantages.โ€™ Thus, the Zionist movement was successful in achieving its main objective of an internationally recognised Jewish homeland, to some extent. This new state did not allow Arabs and Jews to peacefully co-exist, as Herzl had originally intended, because of the nature in which Israel declared its own independence and sided with Western powers, who many Arabs saw as the enemy (Rai, 2014). Nevertheless, the creation of a safe Jewish homeland just three years after the Holocaust in Europe was an enormous success. The movement was also so successful in achieving this particular objective because of the extremely poor and divided Arab opposition and a large amount of political and economic support from the West.

Another objective of the Zionist movement, an extension of the creation of an internationally recognised home, was to re-define the stereotypical Jewish man and create a model socialist society based on democracy, law and equality. It could be said that in 1947 and 1948 Israel failed to achieve this objective. As Greilsammer (2011, p.41) repeatedly states, a secondary key objective for Zionists was โ€˜to form a new Jewish man, strong, healthy and free, both typical and universal, to be an example for other nations.โ€™ Indeed, Lustick (1980, pp.131-132) accurately notes that โ€˜most Zionist founders dreamt of a modern, pluralist, secular, democratic stateโ€™ before concluding that they failed in this objective and, in 1948, โ€˜Instead of creating a new Jew and a state built on mutual tolerance and respect for the Other, Israel fixed certain behaviours and perpetuated divisions.โ€™ Thus, Israel did not represent the model society that many Zionists had dreamt of prior to Israelโ€™s independence in 1948. Indeed, some historians consider the desire to create a model state with model citizens as admirable, but a complete failure in the case of Israel. Because the Zionist movement had elected Palestine as a place to establish their homeland, the economic realities of the region became clear quickly. David Ben-Gurion was unable to improve the economy as quickly as had been expected and โ€˜general austerity was the ruleโ€™ with โ€˜the power of the Labour Party becoming overwhelming and Ben-Gurionโ€™s autocracy was insufferable for manyโ€™ (Davidson, 2002, p.24). In fact, Greilsammer (2011, p.50) is especially critical of the failure of the Zionist movement to create a fair and modern state, commenting that โ€˜the gap between the ideal of the founders of Zionism and reality is even more striking as we consider the theme of โ€˜conquest of laborโ€™ โ€ฆ and the desire to build a society where there would be no exploitation.โ€™ The initial Zionist leaders expressed their desire to allow Arabs to continue living with the same rights that they had. It could even be claimed that Gurion was an idealist in the 1930s, as he claimed that this new Jewish state would have โ€˜one law for all residents, just rule, love of oneโ€™s neighbour, true equality. The Jewish state will be a role model to the world in its treatment of minorities and members of other nations. Law and justice will prevail in our stateโ€™ (Karsh, 2006, p.481).

However, the Zionist movement failed in this objective to create peace and harmony between Arabs who had lived in the region for generations and the newly created Jewish homeland. Herzl himself โ€˜did not envision the Jewish-Arab conflictโ€™ (Eichler, 2016, p.6). Instead of the envisaged peaceful transition into a Jewish majority in Palestine, the 1948 war forced Israel to take a hard-line against any potential Arab enemies. This led to the creation of 700,000 Palestinian refugees. This brutal expulsion was not a reflection of the โ€˜future Jewish national home as an ideal societyโ€™ (Eichler, 2016, p.6). Whilst it is true that Israel remains a full democracy which is supposed to appeal to both Arabs and Jews, for example by having rules such as โ€˜in every Cabinet where the Prime Minister is a Jew, the vice-premiership shall be offered to an Arab and vice versaโ€™ (Karsh, 2006, p.472). Glass (2001) comments that โ€˜Herzl did conceive of a diverse societyโ€™ and that โ€˜the Israeli political system in place over this time is a far cry from Herzlโ€™s own vision.โ€™ Thus, it is apparent that a key objective of the Zionist movement was to create a model society with model citizens that was fair and reflected the best practices of Western democracies. However, in 1948 its treatment of the Palestinian Arab population, combined with economic and social realities of governing such a new and impoverished state meant that Zionists ultimately failed to create a tolerant society and instead built a right-wing anti-Arab state; as Weinstock (1973, p. 43) concludes, โ€˜it is doubtful whether the founders of the Zionist movement would have relished this prospect.โ€™

A third essential objective of the Zionist movement was to fully achieve an end to diaspora and group together all the persecuted Jews from across the globe in one nation to guarantee their safety. This was a goal right from the beginning as Jewish persecution was the essential reasoning for the necessity of a singular Jewish homeland in the first place. Indeed, Greilsammer (2011, p.41) states that โ€˜the first goal of this ideology was to end the Jewish Diaspora โ€ฆ and to bring them to Israel.โ€™ Indeed, with regards to this particular goal the Zionist movement was extremely successful. The expansion of the Jewish community in Palestine was massive in the early 20th century, as the โ€˜Jewish population rose from 24,000 in 1882 to 175,000 in 1931โ€™ (Weinstock, 1973, p. 55). These Aliyahโ€™s involved the emigration of Jews from all over the world, including Jews โ€˜from communist countries after de-Stalinization; Jews from Egypt; Jews from post-Soviet countries, and Ethiopian Jewsโ€™ (Greilsammer, 2011, p.45). This growth in population continued and was accelerated by the Second World War so that, by 1948, the Jewish population was close to 500,000. This was a massive increase in population but did not reflect the initial Zionist ideal of all Jews living in one state.

Indeed, it would be impossible for every single person of the Jewish faith to relocate to Israel; some have found accepting new homes in Britain or the USA whilst some others fear for their own safety if they were to move to the Middle East. Indeed, as Neff (1995, p.6) highlights, โ€˜some Jewish communities, such as the one in Alegria, are not moving to Israel, but to other countries.โ€™ After the mass migrations which took place prior to 1948 the Zionist leadership began to accept that โ€˜the likelihood of mass migration again is extremely lowโ€™ (Greilsammer, 2011, p.46). Indeed, Ben-Gurion himself privately stated that โ€˜the idea of the Zionist โ€˜triumphโ€™, a definitive end to the Diaspora, is not believable anymoreโ€™ (Jensehaugen, 2012, p.289). Moreover, Eichler (2016, p.6) notes that โ€˜Herzl accepted that ending diaspora was unlikelyโ€™ but he still aimed to gather a majority of Jews in one state so that โ€˜Jews who were left in the diaspora would be respected because now the Jews would be a normal people with a normal political homeland.โ€™

Thus, it could be deemed that this objective was successful because the Zionist movement adapted their definition to fit reality; they became aware that not every Jew in the world would want to live in that particular part of the world (Jensehaugen, 2012). However, the leadership still accepted the importance and necessity to encourage Jewish migration, which was effective prior to 1948, so that the Jewish identity and pride could be re-established (Klocke, 2014). The Zionist movement was able to achieve this particular objective with relative ease due to the fact that Jews across Europe had been persecuted terribly for hundreds of years (Morris, 2009, pp. 82-87). This was exposed with events such as the Dreyfus Affair in France, or the Holocaust in Germany or the Pogroms in Eastern Europe (Zollman, 2002). It was not hard for Zionists to convince persecuted Jews to unite together under one sovereign state because that is what a lot of them wished for anyway because of their poor treatment in Europe (Jensehaugen, 2012). Nevertheless, Weinstock (1973, p.53) does raise the important point that โ€˜it is thought that the wave of socialist Zionists (from Eastern Europe) was the main cause of hostility with the Arab population.โ€™ The hostility towards these migrants came from Zionists as well as Arabs and โ€˜Russian Jews were considered by a number of Zionists and members of the Yishuv to constitute a major factor in arousing the hostility of the Palestinian Arabsโ€™ (Weinstock, 1973, p.53). Thus, whilst the Zionist movement may have been as successful as possible in reducing Jewish diaspora around the globe, this may have made it a lot more difficult for Arabs to tolerate them and therefore reduced the success of some of the other Zionist goals.

In conclusion, it is difficult to assess the success of the Zionist movement in 1948 because it was โ€˜continually evolving and adapting during the first half of the 20th centuryโ€™ (Conforti, 2011, p.570). Undeniably, the creation of a sovereign state in 1948 and a Jewish home which could unite any persecuted Jewish people from around the world was a huge success. Furthermore, the establishment of a democratic system and one of the finest legal systems in the world is no small achievement in such a short space of time, considering that mass Jewish migration into the region only really began in 1905 with the Second Aliyah (Morris, 2009, pp.142-144). However, the first Zionist leaders, such as Herzl or Weizmann, wanted to create a model society with model citizens and, perhaps most importantly, felt that their presence in the region would be โ€˜beneficialโ€™ (Weinstock, 1973, p.49). The Zionist movement, for the most part, genuinely believed that there would be enough space in Palestine for new Jewish immigrants and existing Arab citizens (Herzl, 1895). After the 1948 war, however, these objectives completely failed. Hostilities between the Arab countries and Israel was extremely high, 700,000 Palestinian Arab refugees were displaced, and Israel became a right-wing autocratic state for a number of years in an attempt to boost its own economy (Margolick, 2008). However, as outlined by Herzl (1895) the main aims of the Zionist movement should always remain the creation of a Jewish homeland, the end of diaspora and the revival of Hebrew and Jewish culture. These key aims were achieved, to some extent, by the end of 1948.

Any successes that the Zionist movement enjoyed were down to a number of contributing factors. Most important of which was the support from the West (Rogan, 2008). Perhaps borne out of guilt from the atrocities of the Holocaust, or perhaps because the USA saw limitless benefits of having an allied democracy in the region, the West was very eager to support the Zionist movement (Rogan, 2008, pp.23-26). Britainโ€™s withdrawal from the region and the takeover of the Palestine situation by the UN definitely benefitted the Zionist cause as it created the partition plan in 1947 and paved the way for a declaration of Israelโ€™s independence in 1948 (Glass, 2001). Moreover, the disunity between the surrounding Arab states and โ€˜their lack of wealth and infrastructure also made Zionistโ€™s objectives easier to achieveโ€™, as they could buy land cheaply and during the 1948 war they were able to beat a coalition of forces simply due to their better resources and their ability to divide the Arab states (Karsh, 2006, p.479). Thus, the Zionist movement was successful in achieving their main aims in 1948 of ending diaspora and creating a sovereign Jewish state, but this success came at a price and that was the type of state they wanted to build. Israel in 1948 did not reflect the thinking of original Zionists who wanted Arabs and Jews to live side-by-side and wanted to build a model society (Rai, 2014). A more nuanced conclusion would suggest that the Zionist movement was very successful in achieving its objectives in 1948, but this success caused problems later on with surrounding Arab states which has largely tainted the view political historians have on Zionism and its success.

Any successes that the Zionist movement enjoyed were down to a number of contributing factors. Most important of which was the support from the West (Rogan, 2008). Perhaps borne out of guilt from the atrocities of the Holocaust, or perhaps because the USA saw limitless benefits of having an allied democracy in the region, the West was very eager to support the Zionist movement (Rogan, 2008, pp.23-26). Britainโ€™s withdrawal from the region and the takeover of the Palestine situation by the UN definitely benefitted the Zionist cause as it created the partition plan in 1947 and paved the way for a declaration of Israelโ€™s independence in 1948 (Glass, 2001). Moreover, the disunity between the surrounding Arab states and โ€˜their lack of wealth and infrastructure also made Zionistโ€™s objectives easier to achieveโ€™, as they could buy land cheaply and during the 1948 war they were able to beat a coalition of forces simply due to their better resources and their ability to divide the Arab states (Karsh, 2006, p.479). Thus, the Zionist movement was successful in achieving their main aims in 1948 of ending diaspora and creating a sovereign Jewish state, but this success came at a price and that was the type of state they wanted to build. Israel in 1948 did not reflect the thinking of original Zionists who wanted Arabs and Jews to live side-by-side and wanted to build a model society (Rai, 2014). A more nuanced conclusion would suggest that the Zionist movement was very successful in achieving its objectives in 1948, but this success caused problems later on with surrounding Arab states which has largely tainted the view political historians have on Zionism and its success.

Word Count: 3,557


Bibliography:

Conforti, Y. 2011. Between Ethnic and Civic: The Realistic Utopia of Zionism. Israel Affairs. 17(4), pp.563-582.

Davidson, L. 2002. Zionism in the US 1917-1948: Zionism and the betrayal of American Democratic Principles. Journal of Palestine Studies. 1(3), p.21-35.

Eichler, W. 2016. Theodor Herzl and the Trajectory of Zionism. [Online]. [Date Accessed 1 May 2020]. Available from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/theodor-herzl-and-trajectory-of-zionism/

Glass, C. 2001. The Mandate Years Colonialism and the Creation of Israel. [Online]. [Date Accessed 27 April 2020]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/may/31/londonreviewofbooks

Greilsammer, I. 2011. Zionism Between Ideal and Reality. Cairn Info. 47(3), pp.41-51.

Halperin, L. 2015. Origins and Evolution of Zionism. Foreign Policy Research Institute. pp.1-10.

Herzl, T. 1895. The State of the Jews. England: Tredition Classics.

Jensehaugen, J. 2012. Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood. Diplomacy & Statecraft. 23(2), pp.280-303.

Karsh, E. 2006. Resurrecting the Myth: Benny Morris, the Zionist Movement, and the โ€˜Transferโ€™ Idea. Israel Affairs. 11(3), pp.469-490.

Klocke, Z. 2014. An Investigation into Zionismโ€™s Inner Leadership. [Online]. [Date Accessed 24 April 2020]. Available from: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=younghistorians

Lustick, I. 1980. Zionism and the State of Israel: Regime Objectives and the Arab Minority in the First Years of Statehood. 16(1), pp.127-16.

Margolick, D. 2008. Endless War. [Online]. [Date Accessed: 23 April 2020] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/books/review/Margolick-t.html

Morris, B. 2009. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale: Yale University Press.

Neff, D. 1995. The Palestinians and Zionism: 1897-1948. Middle East Policy Council. 4(1), pp.1-10.

Rai, S. 2014. What Were the Causes and Consequences of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War? University of Leicester. 12(2), pp.1-3.

Rogan, E. 2008. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. England: Cambridge University Press.

Weizmann, C. 2005. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Series A: Letters): United Nations; Weizmann First President of Israel; The Prisoner of Rehovot. England: Transaction Publishers.

Weinstock, N. 1973. The Impact of Zionist Colonisation on Palestinian Arab Society Before 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies. 2(2), pp.49-63.

Zollman, J. 2002. The Dreyfus Affair. [Online]. [Date Accessed: 12 April 2020]. Available from: https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/the-dreyfus-affair/


[1] โ€˜Diasporaโ€™ is a term which refers to a scattered population that live beyond the borders of what they would consider their homeland. In this essay the term refers to Jewish people being spread beyond the borders of modern-day Israel.

[2] Early Zionists did not want Arabs working on their land because they thought this was too much like imperialism, but in actual fact it just served to create a Jewish elite with a great deal of wealth.

[3] Refers to the coalition of Arab forces which invaded Israel in 1948, included Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt.

Analyzing the Odds: Trump’s Electoral Prospects in 2024

As the political carousel spins once more towards the possibility of a Trump comeback, I, for one, find myself reaching for the popcorn and wondering, “Could it really happen again?” Yes, folks, you heard it from me, the self-proclaimed Trump critic. So, let’s embark on a journey into the land of political satire, where statistics mingle with humor, and where even the most ardent anti-Trumpers may find a chuckle or two.

In the aftermath of President Biden’s tenure, marked by more twists and turns than a soap opera, some of us skeptics are left scratching our heads and pondering: Could a return to Trumpian antics, at the sprightly age of 78, actually offer a silver lining?

Imagine a world where diplomacy is conducted via Twitter, where snarky tweets and meme-worthy handshakes replace traditional negotiations. It’s an unconventional approach, to say the least, but who am I to deny the entertainment value of international politics on social media?

Now, let’s talk about NATO โ€“ the beloved alliance that brings together nations like a dysfunctional family at Christmas dinner. Remember those summits that felt more like awkward reunions than strategic meetings? Under Trump’s leadership, they were less about alliances and more about awkward encounters and passive-aggressive handshakes. While unconventional, perhaps this unorthodox approach could shake up the status quo in ways we never anticipated. After all, what better way to gauge international relations than through late-night comedians’ material?

And speaking of NATO, did you know that each member country contributes a certain percentage of its GDP to the alliance? It’s like a family potluck, but instead of bringing a dish, you bring a chunk of your national budget. Some countries, like the United States, contribute a hefty portion, while others, well, let’s just say they bring a side salad when everyone else brought a roast turkey. But hey, at least it gives us something to bicker about during those awkward family gatherings โ€“ I mean, NATO summits.

Now, before you start hurling tomatoes at your screen, let me make one thing clear: I’m not hopping aboard the Trump Train anytime soon. If you need proof of how much I dislike him, just read any article about him on this blog! But even the staunchest critics can’t deny the sheer spectacle of American politics.

As we navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty, let’s remember to keep our sense of humour intact. After all, in the wild world of American politics, anything is possible. So, whether you’re a die-hard supporter or a fervent skeptic like me, buckle up and brace yourselves for the next chapter in the saga. It’s sure to be a wild ride!

Remember Dominic Cummings? Neither.

Dominic Mckenzie Cummings, Chief Adviser to Boris Johnson and arguably one of the most hated men in Britain, for those of you who may have justifiably forgotten. They say ‘ignorance is bliss’ and having no knowledge of this guy must be heavenly.

At the beginning of this once in a lifetime crisis Dominic Cummings was the epitome of the Tory party – one rule for them and one rule for us. It will be rare that I will be quoting Peaky Blinders on this blog, but I can’t help remembering Oswald Moseley’s quote, “two men like us for whom forbidding is forbidden”. Moseley, an equally reprehensible character and leader of the British fascist movement in the 1920s and 1930s, would be proud if he could see the way Boris Johnson and Cummings have dodged what would be career-ending for any Labour politician.

For those who don’t know, a bit of background on Cummings. The ‘man’ was special adviser to Michael Gove *sigh* for 7 years, including his time as Secretary for Education where he, for some reason, got rid of AS-Levels and turned GCSE grades into numbers. (I don’t know why, I’ll work it out one day.)

He then left Gove. “Hooray!” you may be thinking. ‘Ding dong the Witch is Dead’ might even be slipped on and you could be forgiven. But no. Instead the timing was actually perfect for Cummings as he immediately took up the position of Director of ‘Vote Leave’ between 2015-2016. *Bigger sigh*.

After his 2016 Brexit victory there came a blissful silence from this ‘man’. Then some people elected Boris so that Brexit thing could happen. Boris created a new position, ‘Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister’, just so he accommodate his Cummings into one of the most senior roles in government, without being elected of course. Just a side-note for those of you who think I am being harsh on Cummings – Sajid Javid, THE CHANCELLOR OF THE UK, resigned after he refused Cumming’s demands that he dismiss one of his Chief Advisers. The Chancellor of the UK, effectively the third most powerful man in Cabinet, was forced to resign because Cummings said so. Cummings has never been elected by anyone; at least Javid has. Make no mistake about who’s in charge – and it certainly isn’t that blonde James Corden look-a-like.

UK does get back some of ยฃ350m it sends to EU, Boris Johnson ...

Remember that famous slogan “ยฃ350 million pounds a week could be spent on the NHS” – you’ll never guess who worked that out. *I need to breathe in now

Cummings list of lies are absolutely incredible – in ANY other job he would be fired and probably face criminal proceedings. A quick reminder of just a few of his lies. Four days after the Prime Minister announced everyone “must stay at home” Mr Cummings was seen leaving his house because his wife believed their four year old to be very ill. He left, then returned to Downing Street 4 hours later. Despite the advice the clear advice that anyone who had symptoms or had come into contact with someone who may have COVID should remain at home for 14 days.

Cummings then drove to Durham because he feared that he and his wife would become seriously ill and need childcare. You may, at this point, have a touch of sympathy for the man. After all, the guidelines were vague when children were involved. ‘Essential travel’ was not fully explained.

Couldn’t he have found childcare closer to him? A friend, family member, care-worker? 240 miles is a long way to go for childcare isn’t it? He also drove to and back from a Hospital because there were ‘no taxis’, despite the advice at that time being – “people with symptoms that may be caused by coronavirus and who do not require hospital treatment are told they “must remain at home until they are well”. I could go on about his various lies since this incident but I’m sure you’re sick to death of reading them. But there are two really interesting aspects to this Cummings case which should be addressed.

The first was the journalism. Journalists these days have almost become identical to politicians: sensationalist, looking for click-bait, questionable sources and bare-faced lies (see Johnny Depp vs The Sun). But the journalism in this case was worthy of Woodward and Bernstein. Release one bit of information about seeing Cummings driving around – let Tory leaders panic, find an excuse, get it out there. Then just as they think they’re safe, add the ‘blog’ incident and the ‘long drive’ incident and watch the Tories scramble for someone to blame. Survival of the fittest has always been their way.

Gollum 2.0

Gollum 2.0

Even more saddening than that is this. The guidelines and advice given at the beginning was most likely checked and double-checked by Cummings before Boris was allowed to announce it. He knew the rules. He knew what Boris was going to say. And he knew the loopholes to stop him being properly charged. That is corruption. He was also aware of the millions of people, you and I included most likely, who weren’t allowed to visit loved ones because we believed their advice. Hindsight is wonderful – but why did we do that? Why did we trust men like Johnson and Cummings? Some say the public reaction was harsh and an overreaction – these people are wrong. It cannot be one rule for them, one rule for us.

It is currently estimated that up to 6.5million jobs could be lost by the end of this lock-down – but I doubt Cummings is too worried.